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AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (POPULIST OR

OTHERWISE)
Michael Mandel*

There was a fine scholarnamed Mark
Who arguedthat, should we all hark
To the "thin'Constitution
It'd be the solution
To the judges going off on a lark
But the critics were heard to remark
"Mark'sthrashingaround in the dark!
What use thin constitutions
When on huge revolutions
We need, after all, to embark?"
(Anon.)
Mark Tushnet has written a great critique of constitutional
judicial review. With his sure grasp of the scholarship, his commitment to the issues and the real people behind them, and his
methodical, flawless reasoning, he has effectively blasted the
theoretical foundations ofjudicial constitutional law to smithereens.
As such, he has made a valuable contribution to legal scholarship
that will remain so for a long time to come.
The essence of Tushnet's critique is that judicial interpretations
of the Constitution have no superior validity (logical, prudential,
legal, historical, etc.) to nonjudicial ones. It logically follows that
there is no democratic reason to allow judges to have any more say
than anyone else on the meaning of the Constitution. Judges being
a tiny minority of the population, this would marginalize them
rather significantly.
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Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto.
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We should be grateful to Tushnet for this, even though it is
certain that his critique will not lead to the overthrow of the system
of judicial review. There are powerful interests behind the system
and only a weakening of them could possibly weaken it (more of this
later). Nevertheless, a critique that goes to the very legitimacy of
judicial review is an important repellant against bad judicial
decisions, of which, as history shows, there are always more than
good ones. The power of judicial review rests on its legitimacy,
because all judges really do is confer or withhold legitimacy (from
concrete acts, social relations, etc.). A critique that weakens the
power of judicial review by delegitimizing it is, therefore, right on
track.
Nevertheless, I have some serious problems with Tushnet's
approach. I am going to illustrate them by placing Tushnet's
contribution in the context of judicial review's critical tradition.
I. THE CRITICAL TRADITION

Tushnet's critique is pretty familiar to Canadians. We have been
debating the fundamental question of judicial review for about
twenty years now, as our system is only that old and many of us can
still remember the political motivations for its sponsorship and even
the (bad) actors who sponsored it. But the democratic critique of
judicial review goes back a long time: to Charles Beard in the
United States,' Edouard Lambert in France,2 Franz Neumann in
Germany,' and the entire Left in Italy during the Constituent
Assembly of 1946-48' to name just the most well-known examples.
The essence of this critique is to view judicial review's historical
mission as being an antidote to democracy, i.e., an antidote to the
mortal danger posed by democratic representative institutions to the
oligarchy of private property. As long as representative institutions
1. See CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (Free Press 1986) (1935); CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION (Prentice-Hall Inc. 1962) (1912). For a recent critique in this tradition, see
RUSSELL GALLOWAY, JUSTICE FORALL? THE RICHAND POOR IN SUPREME COURTHISTORY 1790-

1990 (1991).
2. See EDOUARD B. LAMBERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LIYITE CONTRE LA
ILGISLATION SOCIALE AUX ETATS-UNIS (1921).
3. See Franz Neumann, Rechtsstaat, the Division of Powers and Socialism, in SOCIAL
DEMOCRACYAND THE RULE OF LAW 66 (Keith Tribe ed., Leena Tanner & Keith Tribe trans.,
1987).
4. See Michael Mandel, Legal Politics, Italian Style, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 261 (C. Neal Tate & Thorbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995).
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were kept the personal possessions of the rich, primarily through
limitations on the suffrage, their constitutional theorists sang the
praises of legislative sovereignty. But the moment the propertied
classes lost control of these institutions, these same constitutional
theorists started to worry about the "tyranny of the majority" (the
way they never worried about the "tyranny of the minority"). They
hurried to the drawing board and came racing back with judicial
review. Like the Italiangattopardo(leopard), they changed everything
(namely constitutional theory) so that everything (namely the
oligarchy of the wealthy) would remain the same. They placed
boundaries around government action and called on the legal
profession to police the boundaries.5
The critique of judicial review as reactionary in a class sense was
conventional wisdom on the Left before the Second World War. It
got side-tracked for a short period after that because of the worldfamous liberal period ofthe U.S. Warren Court, lasting roughly from
Brown v. Boardof Education,6 through Mirandav. Arizona,7 to Roe
v. Wade.8 It was only to be expected that the critique would return
once the "hope" of the Warren Court revealed itself to be "hollow,"9
and the American judiciary returned to its familiar position to the
Right of government. The hope was hollow because the American
judiciary, even at its best, delivered only a very narrow, bourgeois
conception of constitutional rights, completely divorced from
questions of property and social class. Desegregate the public
schools, but do nothing to prevent their desertion by anyone who
could afford it, and their consequent deterioration through neglect.'"
Forbid the criminalization of abortion, but say it is perfectly all right
to refuse funding to women who could not afford it, and even to ban
it from "any public facility."" Insist on due process, but at the same
time create so much inequality that violence becomes uncontrollable
and repression is ratcheted up to the point where the U.S. prison

5. See Michael Mandel, A Brief History of the New Constitutionalism or "How We
ChangedEverything So That Everything Would Remain the Same," 32 ISR.L. REV. 250, 251
(1998).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? (1991).
10. See id. at 72-106.
11. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504-13 (1989).
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population has become legendary, on top of an execution rate that
has returned to its pre-Warren Court levels. 2
Nor is the antidemocratic record ofU.S. constitutionalism unique:
from Nazi Germany to Pinochet's Chile, the courts have harassed
the reformers and backed the tyrants all the way. And if they should
lose their senses and take their independence seriously, to the point
where they actually become a problem for the power brokers, as the
Russian constitutional court did in 1993, the tanks are sent in, the
constitutionalists13 applaud, and the International Monetary Fund
picks up the tab.
II. MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CANADA
The course of modern constitutionalism in Canada has been a
textbook case of constitutional politics as antidemocratic politics.' 4
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the "Charter")'5 of

12. About two million adults were in jail or prison on anygiven day in 1998, see U.S. Dep't
of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, CorrectionStatistics (last modified Feb. 28, 2000)
<http:www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm>, and another 4.1 million on parole orprobation, see
U.S. Dep't of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Statistics (last
modified Aug. 22, 1999) <http:www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjslpandp.htm>. The 98 executions of 1999
were the most in any year since 1951, which totaled 105. See Death Penalty Information
Center,Executions in 1999 (visitedApr. 10, 2000) <http'//www.essential.orgdpicdpicexec99.
html>; Bureau ofJusticeStatistics,Sourcebook of CriminalJusticeStatisticsOnline (visited
Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook>.
13. It seems to me that, as far back as 1846, Marx and Engels had a very good grasp of
the limits of the judicial independence, one that would predict such events as the violent
confrontation in Moscow in September 1993:
The division of labour... manifests itself also in the ruling class as the division
of mental and material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the
thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting
of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the
others' attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive,
because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time
to make up illusions and ideas about themselves. Within this class this cleavage
can even develop into a certain opposition and hostility between the two parts,
which, however, in the case of a practical collision, in which the class itself is
endangered, automatically comes to nothing, in which case there also vanishes
the semblance that the ruling ideas were not the ideas of the ruling class and
had a power distinct from the power of this class.
Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, The German Ideology: PartI, in THE MARX-ENGELs READER
146, 173 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
14. Most of what follows is a summary of matters discussed in great detail in MICHAEL
MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTs AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA (Thompson

Educ. Publ'g, rev. ed. 1994).
15. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
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1982 was introduced primarily to thwart the aspirations of the
French majority of Qu6bec who were seeking to escape their secondclass status and become "masters in their own house." When the
Qu6bec provincial government started to exercise its considerable
sovereign legislative authority under the constitution of 1867 in a
way that challenged English hegemony (in a province eighty-percent
French), the rest of Canada decided it was time to change everything so that everything would remain the same. The old constitution was declared, for the first time in history, to be amendable
without Qu6bec's consent and sweeping constitutional changes were
introduced to overrule Quebec's language legislation. The federal
courts proved faithful executors of this federal policy, if not of the
constitutional text itself. They twisted the words of both the new
Charter and the old constitution to harass the independentist
government, striking down its laws on the language of legislation,
education and business signs, despite the fact that these laws used
scrupulously democratic means to achieve the totally legitimate end
of breaking the economic and social stranglehold of English in the
province.' 6 Recently, with referenda on Quebec's independence
approaching within a whisker of success, the government of Canada
asked its hand-picked Supreme Court to come to the rescue, which
it did with some classic antidemocratic constitutional reasoning: a
"mere majority" would not be enough in a referendum to even start
negotiations on independence; and, whatever international law said,
and however many referenda it won, Qu6bec could never achieve
independence without the consent of the rest of Canada. 7
Despite the absence of the word "property" in the Charter of
Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada has, like other constitutional
courts more fortunately endowed, faithfully defended the oligarchic
market principle of "one dollar, one vote" against the democratic
menace of "one person, one vote." For example, the Supreme Court
has used "freedom of expression" to entrench the fundamental
human right of tobacco companies to advertise their lethal
products.' 8 And, though the Supreme Court found "freedom of
association" robust enough to include the right of companies to
merge, it could not for the life of it find any room in the same
concept for the right to collective bargaining, much less the right to
16. See MANDEL, supranote 14, at 19-38, 127-76.
17. See Reference re Secession of Quebec from Canada [1998] S.C.R. 217; see also Michael
Mandel, Un cour au service du gouvernement canadien,LE DEVOIR, Oct. 1, 1998, at A9.
18. See RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General) [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; MANDEL,
supra note 14, at 327-32.
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strike. 9 Canadian courts have also ensured that, through four
federal elections and one national referendum, there have been no
controls on campaign spending, because, following the inexorable
"one dollar, one vote" logic of American jurisprudence, they struck
them down as an interference with "freedom of expression."2 ° The
Supreme Court has also decided, in acquitting one of the world's
major purveyors of Holocaust-denial literature, Ernst Zundel, that
"freedom of expression" in Canada includes the right to tell deliberate Nazi lies.2 It has also equated "freedom of religion" with the
right to do business seven days a week.22 And, while it has made a
lot of noise about protecting the procedural rights of people charged
with crimes and of refugee applicants, it has crafted its judgments
so as not to interfere either with a rate of repression that (though
dwarfed by the great example of the United States of America) has
spiralled out of control, or with the restrictive immigration policies
of one of the world's richest countries.23 While corporate criminals
and racists seem to be able to take advantage of these procedural
rights, for the usual suspects they seem to be mainly a way of
making us feel better about more punishment.24
Though women have won some decisions, the Charter has been a
double-edged sword. Many cases, for example, in sports, labor
relations, maternity benefits and child-care expenses, have pitted
individual women, not against men, but against most other
women. 5 The Supreme Court has also decided that the Charter
includes the right of rapists' lawyers to harass rape victims on the
witness stand, but that it does not give a nurses' union the right to
say "the law is an ass."26 The Court's belated defense of abortion
rights did not include the right to abortion funding, which has had
to be won, trench by trench, at the political level. 7 Similarly, the
Court's halting defense of gay and lesbian rights wound up looking
like nothing more than an attempt to scramble atop a legislative
bandwagon that had almost passed it by.28 On the high-profile

19. See MANDEL, supranote 14, at 262-83.
20. See id. at 288-93.
21. See id. at 369-76.
22. See id. at 313-27.
23. See id. at 240-57.
24. See id. at 220-40.
25. See id. at 399-405.
26. Id. at 383-89, 281-82.
27. See id. at 428-33.
28. See M. v. H. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3; Vriend v. Alberta [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493. But see Egan v.
Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
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subject of aboriginal rights, the Supreme Court, with the aid of great
rhetorical camouflage, managed to stall for a generation and
actually to impose "reasonable limits" on rights that are written into
the constitution in unlimited terms, including the accommodation
of the rights of commercial extraction interests.2 9 According to my
colleague Kent McNeil, the Supreme Court's landmark decision on
aboriginal rights was "simply perverse" in subscribing to the view
that "what is good for Macmillan Bloedel [the paper company] is
good for Canada.'"3
III. BACK TO TUSHNET
Given the United States's enormous heft in the world, we can
forgive our American cousins their natural tendency to navel gaze.
And though Tushnet's excursions into comparative law are far too
few, they are, nevertheless, fairly well-informed.3 They certainly
avoid the cheerleading naivete characteristic of some of his colleagues.3 2 On the other hand, they highlight what I believe to be the
central problem with the Tushnet approach, namely its effective
detachment from the historical and political context ofconstitutional
law, without which, I believe, it is almost impossible to comprehend.
Let me give two examples from Canada, one of local, and the other
of general significance.
Take the example of Canada's "Notwithstanding Clause."33
Tushnet canvasses it as one possible constitutional way of dethroning the Supreme Court, though in a footnote he adverts to the fact
that it "got caught up in the controversy over the status of Quebec,
and something like a convention against using the override appears
to have emerged."3 4 This is approximately correct, pretty close in

29. See MANDEL, supra note 14, at 353-69; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [19971 3
S.C.R. 1010.
30. Has the Supreme Court finally got it right? 'Yes and no," says Robarts Chair in
CanadianStudies Kent McNeil, YORK UNiv. GAZETE, Apr. 22, 1998, at 3.
31. See MARK TUSHNET, TAmING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COuRTS (1999).

Nobody is going to worry much that he misspelled Morgentaler,Canada's Roe v. Wade, see id.
at 139, but for the well-deserved next printing, maybe Princeton University Press could
correct it!
32.

See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE RISE OF WORLD CONSTIrrTONALIsM (Yale Law Sch.

Occasional Papers 2d Series No. 3, 1997).
33. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 33.
34. TUSHNET, supranote 31, at 221 n.51.
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fact, but it glosses over something extremely important, namely the
politics of the Notwithstanding Clause.
The Notwithstanding Clause was inserted in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a political compromise. The
ruling Liberals' (federal government) main battle, as I explained
above,35 was with Qu6bec (provincial government) over the status of
French and English in the province. The federal Liberals brought
the reluctant English-speaking provinces (what we call the Rest of
Canada ("ROC")) on-side by inserting a clause in the Charter that
would allow provinces to opt out of practically everything-everything that is, but those irreconcilable questions dividing the federal
government and the government of Qu6bec (for example, mobility
rights, official languages, and minority language education rights).
The Notwithstanding Clause is actually a major clue to the political
purposes behind the Charter: everything could be overridden for our
rights-loving Prime Minister Trudeau except the relatively minor
rights having to do with his struggle with Qu6bec. You could
override equality, conscience, association, due process, and the rest
of the big rights, but not the right to move to Qu6bec and have your
children educated in English there!
Nor is it a "convention" that prevents the clause from being used
outside Qu6bec: it is powerful institutions such as the federal
government and the big-business media (who love the Charter as
part of their hatred of real democracy). Their constant public
veneration of the Charter has made use of the Notwithstanding
Clause a political impossibility in almost all cases. Most likely, they
are keeping it in reserve should there ever be a decision that really
challenges their interests. Otherwise, the clause has a tendency, in
Canadian judicial discourse, to legitimate judicial review. Every
time the Supreme Court prepares to do something unpopular, it
reminds everyone that the Notwithstanding Clause gives the
legislatures the final say. Then it proceeds to declare that "fundamental dignity" requires such and such, and the Notwithstanding
Clause is never used. The Notwithstanding Clause has become just
another device in the elite game of constitutional politics. No doubt
this would be its fate in the unlikely event that it was adopted in the
United States.

35. See supranote 16 and accompanying text.

2000]

AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

An example of broader significance is the question of "social
rights." Tushnet argues that, if judicial review were abolished, it
might be easier to insert social rights into the Constitution, because
the main objection to them is precisely their enforceability:
Freed of concerns about judicial review, we might also be able to
develop a more robust understanding of constitutional social welfare
rights, which are recognized in many constitutions around the world.
Generally, constitutions adopted after 1945 contain guarantees of such
rights-to employment, to housing, to a minimally decent standard of
living, and the like. Today as nations contemplate constitutional
revisions-in Canada and the European Union, for example-strong
voices urge that the new documents should contain a "Social
Charter.""6

Once again, this is an analysis totally devoid of the political
reality in which constitutional social rights actually live and make
sense. In fact, the attempt to put unenforceable social rights in the
constitution divided the Left in Canada. The (successful) opponents
were opposed, not because we were against social rights, but
because their insertion into the constitutional project was so
obviously part of a strategy by Right-wing governments and sell-out
Left-wing governments to legitimate their very concrete destruction
of the public sphere through cuts to public health and education,
privatization, deregulation, wage controls, "free" trade ("free" for
those with the economic power to buy it) and so on. Their idea was
to put social rights in the constitution instead of putting them in
force, or to celebrate their inclusion in the constitution to make us
forget that these very same people who were sponsoring social rights
in the constitution were destroying them in practice. The same goes
for the social rights in the European Union: an unenforceable sop to
the workers to legitimate the highly enforceable total economic
integration so desired by business."7 And the same goes for all the
social rights in the constitutions of the twentieth century, from the
Mexican, through the Italian, to the South African. Italian constitutionalist Piero Calamandrei hit the nail right on the head when he
said of the Italian Constituent Assembly:
Thus to compensate the forces of the Left for the missed revolution, the
forces of the Right did not oppose the gathering up in the constitution

36. TUSHNET, supra note 31, at 169.
37. See Stephen J. Silvia, The Social Charterof the European Community: A Defeatfor
EuropeanLabor, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 626 (1991).
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of a promised revolution... well knowing that, once the moment of
crisis had passed, the reforming impulses would lose their urgency,
and, once
they had ceased to boil, could remain in waiting for another
38
century.

To be fair to Tushnet, it is clear that the main problem with social
rights in twentieth-century constitutions is that they have been
enacted or interpreted (sometimes without textual support-as in the
case of Italy and the European Union"s ) as second-class, completely
unenforceable rights, in a context of first-class, eminently enforceable property rights. So, their character as pure legitimation has
been hard to miss. Tushnet does not make the error of thinking
some good will come of unenforceable social rights in a framework
of enforceable property rights. Instead, he wants to make all rights
unenforceable. Does this make things better? That depends on
whether unenforceable constitutional rights are a good or bad thing,
on what role we might expect them to actually play. But, this is the
one question that Tushnet does not investigate, besides the entirely
noncommittal speculation that "in this context at least rhetoric may
matter."0
IV.

THE PROBLEM WITH POPULIST CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

And this is my major frustration with the book: its purely legal,
as opposed to historical or political or philosophical, approach to
these questions. This is clearly not limited to Tushnet's discussions
of the experience of other countries. It also dominates his own idea of
"populist constitutional law."
Tushnet devotes relatively little time to populist constitutional law,
only seventeen out of one hundred and ninety-four pages of text,4 ' but
this does not mean it is not important to him. In the preface, he
describes his whole book as being "in the service of what I call
populist constitutional law" and explains that it is populist "because

38. Piero Calamandrei, Cenni introduttivisulla costituente e sui suoi lavori, in 2 PIERO
CALAMANDREI, SCRrITEDIscoRsIPoLITImC461-62 (Norberto Bobbio ed., 1966) (original source

in Italian, translation provided by the author).
39. See Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a TransnationalCapitalistSociety: The Court of
Justice,Social Policy, and IndividualRights under the EuropeanCommunity's Legal Order,
37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 309 (1996).

40. TUSHNET, supranote 31, at 171.
41. See id. at 177-94.
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it distributes responsibility for constitutional law broadly."42 So,
though the title may be Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts, the subtitle could be "and giving it to the people."
But it is not the Constitution that the courts have administered
for two centuries that Tushnet wants to give to the people. That
Constitution, the racist and sexist document that entrenched
slavery and protected the rich against having their debts not paid
is headed for the trash can. The constitution he wants to give to the
people is a radically pruned "thin"Constitution that is trimmed of
everything but the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution's Preamble. And even these documents are not to be taken
literally. Not just because they remain stamped by sexism and
racism (only "men are created equal" and even that does not seem
to have included "the merciless Indian Savages"). In Tushnet's
vision, populist constitutional law is "law oriented to realizing the
principlesofthe Declaration of Independence and the Constitution's
Preamble. More specifically, it is a law committed to the principle
of universal human rights justifiable by reason in the service of selfgovernment."' Now that really is thin. If pressed to answer while
hopping on one foot, like Hillel, Tushnet could probably reduce it all
to the Golden Rule.
But what if the problem were not what the Constitution consisted
of, or who was interpreting it, but constitutional interpretation
itself? In other words, what good is constitutional law of any sort?
Why bother? Not why bother with human rights or the Golden Rule,
but why cast them in the form of constitutional law, populist or
otherwise? I am not sure Tushnet even sees this question, because
he writes:
We could defend populist constitutional law defined in this way by
explaining why the idea of universal human rights is a good one."

No we couldn't. To defend populist constitutional law, we would
have to say why the good idea of defending human rights (let us
forget the monumental question begging in this for a moment)
should be carried on in the form of constitutional law (whatever that
would mean without the courts). We can't seriously think we're

42. Id. at x.

43. Id. at 181 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
44. Id.
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going to have a whole symposium about whether the idea of human
rights is a good one. We would have to argue why this way is a good
way of struggling for human rights, human liberation, human
equality or however we might want to put it. Because a lot has been
happening in the last 200 years. People have been struggling and
learning and thinking about "human rights" in many
nonconstitutional ways. They have been organizing and fighting and
writing, not constitutions, but manifestos, books, articles, poems,
songs, plays, movies and so on. If I were looking for blueprints or
signposts, that is where I would look, not in the Declaration of
Independence or in the Golden Rule.
Not only that, for almost all of this period, constitutional law has
been just another obstacle in these struggles. We have to know why
we should expect better of any other form of constitutional law than
the one we've had. We have to at least be given some suggestions.
But Tushnet does not choose to answer any of these questions or
even any version of them: "That would be a philosopher's task
rather than a lawyer's."45 So he gives us what he takes to be a
lawyer's defense of populist constitutional law. And what is that?
There is another way ofjustifying populist constitutional law. The
idea ofuniversal human rights resonates powerfullywith the historical
experience of the people of the United States. Our public policies have
been guided by that idea, imperfectly to be sure but consistently
through our history....
Astute observers have understood that the Constitution was a
populist document, in the sense that the American people were
constituted by our adherence to the thin Constitution.4 6

So popular constitutional law based on the thin Constitution is
legally justified by the fact that we are constituted by it (It's our
constitution on account of we're constituted by it! "Gee, Officer
Krupke..."). There's a legal argument for you: we're bound by it,
like precedent.
There are two very serious problems with this. The first is
whether we can even for a moment be thought to be constituted by
a commitment to the idea of universal human rights. Ask yourselves, in what sense does this characterize American history?

45. Id.
46. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Tushnet's proof is all of one page long and consists of quotes from
Abraham Lincoln, Hector St. John Crevecoeur, and Frances
Wright." But aren't things a little more complicated than that?
Aren't we leaving a few things out? Like the Ku Klux Klan, Joe
McCarthy and the whole American Right, for example? Is American
history not also characterized by slavery, racism, exploitation,
imperialism, and the systematic violation of human rights?"
Here is another, rather more true-to-life view of what "constitutes" American history from Eric Foner's recent review of the
American twentieth century as it appeared in the pages of the
Nation:
The first [central development] is the triumphant growth of American
corporate capitalism (overcoming disasters like the Great Depression
and the challenge posed by socialism and communism) and the
concomitant emergence of the United States as the world's pre-eminent
power, striving, sometimes with calamitous results for the rest of
mankind, to remake the globe in the American image. The second is
the unfinished struggle between the powerful and the disempowered,
the free and the less free, the haves and the want-to-haves, over what
kind of country this hegemonic power is and ought to be.

As this century turns, America's historic sense ofmission has been
redefined to mean the creation of a single global free market in which
capital, natural resources and human labor are nothing more than
factors of production in an endless quest for ever-greater productivity
and profits, while activities with broader social aims are criticized as
burdens on international competitiveness.
Even as the United States has risen to become the predominant
international power, however, conflict has persisted over the nature of
American society itself and what its role in the world should be. This
debate has involved not only political leaders and captains of industry
but the struggles of anonymous men and women protesting their
exclusion from the "pursuit of happiness" promised by the Declaration
of Independence and the "blessings of liberty" enshrined in the
Constitution. Often in the face of powerful opposition and government
repression, popular social movements of workers, feminists, civil
libertarians and many others have done much to shape the twentieth

47. See id. at 182.
48. Is it really necessary to give citations for this proposition? Just read anything by
Noam Chomsky.
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century, extending American rights and freedoms into realms
inconceivable in 1900.

History, however, is not a linear narrative of progress. Rights may
be won and taken away; gains are never complete or uncontested, and
popular movements generate their own countervailing pressures. As
the century draws to a close, long-discredited ideas (social Darwinism,
belief in inborn racial inequality and the "natural" differences between
the sexes) again occupy respected positions in public discourse.
Today's attacks on affirmative action, abortion rights, freedom of
expression and the separation of church and state remind us that, as
the abolitionist Thomas Wentworth Higginson put it during the Civil
War, "revolutions may go backwards." Nonetheless, America at the
turn of this century is a far freer, more egalitarian society than in
1900, the result not of the immanent logic of a supposed American
Creed of justice and equality but of struggles on picket lines and at
lunch counters, in polling booths and even in bedrooms.

From the Spanish-American War to Vietnam, citizen movements
have also challenged the dominant imperial vision of American power
and the ways the United States has ridden roughshod over others'
rights of self-determination. Today's challenges to the ideology of
globalization by a revitalized labor movement, environmentalists and
others are heirs to a long tradition that imagines this country's
worldwide role as the promotion of greater social equality rather than
military power and corporate profits.

Of the questions that have preoccupied Americans for the past two
centuries none are more pressing than the vast inequalities in wealth,
income and power spawned by capitalism's heedless expansion....

... Yet in our own country, democracy is in disarray: Fewer than
half the population bothers to vote, and distrust of government as an
alien and intrusive force is pervasive. Much of this disillusionment
stems from the popular belief (not unreasonable, based on recent
experience) that our political system is so corrupted by money that only
wealthy individuals and giant corporations can expect to have their
interests attended to by the state. The challenge of the new century is
whether this disillusionment with the functioning of our democracy can
become the basis for a revitalization of the traditions of American
radicalism.49

49. Eric Foner, The Century:A Nation's-Eye View, NATION, Jan. 10, 2000, at 5-7.
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If this analysis rings as true as Tushnet's rings false, it is because
nothing could be clearer than that American history is "constituted"
by a complex and contradictory reality, much closer to Marx's and
Engels's history as "the history of class struggles" than a commitment to "the idea of universal human rights." And, thick or thin, the
Constitution has been most often on the dark side of this struggle:
legitimating racism, fighting affirmative action, and corrupting the
political system with wealth.
It is the farthest thing from the truth to say that the thin
Constitution, no matter how thin you make it, is what "constitutes"
us. It's almost like saying The West Wing is what the American
Presidency is all about, instead of what some people would like us
to think it's all about.
Is it not, at least, a "noble lie"? Should we not be "constituted" by
our best aspirations instead of by our ugly realities? I have no
problem with aspirations. I have a problem with them masquerading as reality. Then they degenerate into apology and legitimation.
I want to keep the "is" and the "ought" separate. It promotes clear
thinking (remember the famous debate on this between Hart and
Fuller") and clear thinking is essential if one is going to do battle
effectively. But separating the ideal from the real is what constitutional lawyers seem to find impossible. They take an ugly reality
and dress it up in abstract principle and then tell us we are
powerless to change it. We are bound by it (it's the law!). That's how
the real constitutionalism has been able to make itself an obstacle
to human rights. A fancy way for lawyers to tell us we can't have
them: you can't abolish debt, that's impairment of contracts; you
can't abolish slavery, that's interference with property rights; you
can't enact the ten-hour day, that's a violation of due process; you
can't have affirmative action, that's a violation of the equality
clause; you can't put limits on campaign spending, that violates
freedom of expression.
Tushnet doesn't want to use his populist constitutional law in this
way, of course; he wants to take the ugly reality, dress it up in
principle and use it to advance human rights, not obstruct them.
Does that make any difference?

50. See H.L.A. Hart, Legal Positivismand the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 598 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1958).
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As I said earlier, I am convinced that Tushnet's project of taking
the Constitution from the courts will fail. Because as long as there
is universal suffrage on the one hand and an oligarchy of property
on the other, the oligarchs will want their lawyers in place to police
the boundaries. Democracy of the "one person, one vote" variety is
just too dangerous to the oligarchy of private property without lots
of what the Italian Socialist Nenni called "diaphragms."5 ' It seems
to me that the only way to fight this is to fight the premise: that
constitutionalism is anything more than ideology seeking to mask
itself as interpretation.
Tushnet has gone halfway but not all the way. He has challenged
the courts' final say but he has not challenged the project of
constitutional law itself. In this sense, his achievement is in the
Dworkinian tradition of making some room for the legal intellectual
to engage in constitutional argument free of any "standing" issues
or inferiority complexes. Dworkin's problem was democracy, because
he wanted to defend an activist liberal court from the claim that it
was undemocratic. 52 Tushnet's problem is the different one of how
to wrest the constitutional monopoly from a politically conservative
court. Exit Dworkin, enter Tushnet.
But the method of the old constitutionalists and the new constitutionalists is the same. It's a method that allows them to avoid
debate on the real issues (right and wrong, good and bad, left and
right, what to do?) and, instead, to dress up their positions as
constitutional interpretations. Far be it from them to duke it out
with mere mortals on an equal footing. They are going to tell us why
we are constitutionally bound to do what they are advocating,
whether we like it or not. It's the same old phony constitutional
project that the judges and lawyers have used, mostly against, but
sometimes, though in a very limited way, in favor of Tushnet's
conception of human rights (which, in substance, is probably not far
from my own). And my objection to it is not only that the Right-

51.

One could say that the secret vice of this constitution is the same one that

can be found at every stage of our history, from the Risorgimento on:
distrust of the people, fear of the people and sometimes terror of the
people; the need to place between the expression of the popular will and
its execution as many obstacles, as many diaphragms, as possible.
Pietro Nenni, La Costituzione della Repubblica nei lavori preparatori dell'Assemblea
Costituente Roma (Mar. 10, 1947), in COSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 324 (1970) (original source in

Italian, translation provided by author).
52. See generally RONALD D. DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); RONALD D. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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constitutionalists will always outnumber the Left-constitutionalists
(because that's the class nature of the legal profession), but that its
very method is one that excludes everybody else. And that really
dooms the project from a human rights point of view, dooms it to
forever reproduce only those human rights solutions that make
sense to the legal profession.
Constitutional law can no more be populist than the Pope can be
Jewish or the Chief Rabbi Catholic. This populism business is, in
the end, just a way for the professors to legitimate themselves in
their arguments with the courts. They're not going to actually lea~e
anything up to the people. Populist constitutional law, in or out of
Tushnet's Utopia, will be like the old joke about the Soviet definition
of an automobile ("a four-wheeled motorized vehicle driven by the
toiling masses in the shape of their freely elected representatives"):
constitutional law interpreted by the people in the shape of their
freely elected law professors.
So thanks for the critique of the courts, Mark, but no thanks for
populist constitutional law.

